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  Tiffany Sutton
Abstract
This essay examines a form of video art -- what is called a
"video environment" -- that calls upon as much as it departs
from familiar conventions that are bound up in museum
display. I argue that the way that works in this genre are
housed in museums enables them to give rise to a form of
contemplation, one involving immersion, that is, if not unique
to this genre, then certainly demonstrated by it. My examples
of video environments make a case for the coherence of this
rarely experienced immersive form of contemplation, the value
of which, in turn, makes a case for the genre's further
development.
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1. Prologue on Video History[1]
In the early 1950s, video technology was used primarily for
television broadcast by the major studios. With only a few
exceptions, such as Nam June Paik's electronic Fluxus
sculptures made out of magnetized television sets, first
exhibited in 1958, the artistic development of video awaited
the Sony Portapak's introduction to American consumers in
1965. Arguably the first time-based artwork in video came in
the youth-driven documentary form of the street tape
(paradigmatically, Les Levine's Bum in 1965), which employed
the Portapak to advantage. And throughout video art's brief
history, artists have been drawn to the medium in search of
such unique opportunities to ride the wave of a developing
technology, in the avant-garde spirit of defining a medium and
finding new modes of artistic expression.
The moment that digital video became possible around 1990,
for example, artists sought ways to exploit "light speed"
(Avid™, E=MC2™) editing systems. The resulting "on-the-fly"
editing techniques (editing in the process of recording from a
source disk, with no rewinding or previewing involved) did not,
however, produce work that (for the most part) outlasted the
momentary fascination with the new, though it has become a
staple for live-news show editors. Some of the most deeply
moving and admired artistic work in video -- such as work by
Mary Lucier, Bill Viola, Tony Oursler, Joan Jonas, Chris Marker,
Dan Graham, and Gary Hill -- has molded the technology to its
own purposes, all but disregarding the state of the technology,
though often incorporating new devices. In particular, artists
working in the "installation" format ("video sculpture") have
conceived of their work in terms that are continuous with more
traditional forms of visual art, such as painting and sculpture,
and their modes of display.
This essay will examine a form of video art that is called a
"video environment," which calls upon as much as it departs

from familiar conventions that are bound up in museum
display. I will argue in Sections 2 and 3 that the way that
works in this genre are housed in museums enables them to
give rise to a form of contemplation -- one involving
immersion -- that is, if not unique to this genre, certainly
demonstrated by it. In other words, video environments make
a case for the coherence of this rarely experienced immersive
form of contemplation, at the same time that the value of the
kind of contemplation they enable makes a case for the further
development of the genre. By discussing relevant examples of
them in Section 4 and thus illuminating video environments as
a genre, I will then be in a position to make a case for the
possibility of contemplation that is immersive in the foregoing
sense, which, in turn, will help me to show how works in this
genre can perform the social function that gives them unique
value.
2. The Museum Context, Defamiliarization, and
Contemplation
At some point in the late 1970's, when video artists began to
reach a consensus that the medium had been defined,
attention turned to the choice among viewing contexts. It
turns out that one's choice of viewing contexts in video makes
all the difference, given that there is such a range of them,
from traditional cinema viewing to living room viewing to
computer display. Choosing to display video in a museum
brings it under a set of conventions and expectations that are
raised no matter what work is introduced. The one that I am
thinking of in particular is the defamiliarization of the familiar.
Taken with certain forms of video art, this is a convention for
responding to the museum that can be put to new uses that
respond to our technologically saturated world.
Pioneered by the Louvre when its doors were first opened to
the public in 1793, the convention I am speaking of should be
familiar. Think of your own body as you enter an art museum.
There is a palpable transformation that occurs as you cross the
threshold after having been immersed in the everyday, to
which Arthur Danto counter-poses the "merengue," which
stands for everything extra-museal: You begin to feel more
aware of your own presence in space, and you might even
begin to feel more upright in relation to the objects you
encounter.[2] At the very least, you encounter yourself in
relation to unfamiliar objects; thus your body is defamiliarized
and your proprioceptive sense is transformed.
The defamiliarization of the familiar is also the principle driving
Cartesian meditation. Contemplation, in Descartes' view,
occurs when customary relations with the everyday are
suspended, and thinking turns in upon all that it once took for
granted.[3] In a museum, I propose, the spatialization of this
method of eliciting contemplation, the method of radical doubt,
turns Cartesian thought on its head and is allied with strains of
thought developed in the twentieth century, such as
pragmatism and ordinary language philosophy, that take the
physical world as a given and not open to radical doubt.[4]
As philosophers began to theorize telerobotics and other forms
of electronically transmitted knowledge-at-a-distance,
including video, Hubert Dreyfus predicted that electronic
technologies raising questions of telepistemology would turn

around the longstanding triumph of the physical world of
science in philosophy, opening consensus once again to radical
doubt.[5] Instead of being brains in a vat, the doubting
Thomas now says, we might all be metazoans running around
in a world like the matrix (of The Matrix), creations of an evil
genius programmer. Dreyfus thought that either thought would
go this way, or else the stark contrast between actual and
virtual worlds, perhaps just our incorrigible preference for hugs
over e-mails, were we ever forced to choose, would fend off
the re-emergence of scepticism in philosophy and in popular
culture as well. But maybe it is not so far-fetched to hold that
global-scale behavior, 'as if' bodies did not exist might subtly,
over time, weave beliefs, even in evil genius programmers,
that silicon is as dubious a substance as flesh, and that, as
Descartes speculated, an evil demon might be masterminding
the modern sense of dysfunction that plagues the cogito
otherwise known as humanity.
Doubting not that I think and exist, and that there are similar
others in the world who must all somehow dwell on a planet
with limited natural resources that we should continue to learn
something about, is no dissolute disposition. Being optimistic
about the capacity of the human intellect to learn its own
nature, similarly, is not a disposition that falls easily into
"sceptical paralysis" because, knowing where scepticism leads,
one can stop before ever "counterbalancing" beliefs, that is,
before entertaining the Cartesian posits (such as evil demons)
that are mutually exclusive with one's beliefs about one's
beliefs' origins.[6]
By the mere effort at learning where scepticism leads, does
one, against one's will, fall into sceptical paralysis for having
counterbalanced? In that case, from a position of sceptical
paralysis, I can decide with William James, wishfully thinking,
that it is best to behave as if my belief that I am embodied is
true, because behaving otherwise would not serve any vital
function. However, does mere counterbalancing amount to
falling into sceptical paralysis? I fail to see that it does, in
cases where one of the two counterbalanced beliefs tips the
scales, and the attempt at counterbalancing fails, for example,
if I fail to imagine a world in which an evil demon is the source
of all of my beliefs about the physical world, newly revealed to
be false.
Catherine Wilson's alternative framework for worrying about
behavior as if bodies did not exist, is modeled on Heidegger's
thinking about the dangers of technology and, accordingly,
borrows and revitalizes his terminology.[7] On Wilson's view,
sceptical thinking and behavior are represented as a kind of
wholesale "immersion" in the use of technologies that provide
"inauthentic" and "vicarious" access to the "thingliness of
things" and also of people that we cannot meaningfully or fully
incorporate into our everyday, embodied lives:
"Heidegger assumed that a cultural preference for the
mediated over the proximal, and the emotionally complex,
excessive, and useless over the concrete and instrumental
signified a move away from the 'thingly element of things.' But
does not our capacity to produce vicarious experiences bring
us ever closer to the thingly element of more things?"
And, indeed, this becomes the criticism:

"Heidegger did not foresee that a problem about technology, if
not 'the' problem, might arise not from its monstrous opacity
and its inability to function as anybody's 'equipment' but from
the effortless access it provides to the 'thingliness of things.'
"[8]
I will discuss not the "telefictive" kind of experience Wilson
problematizes but the representation of the conditions of
telefictive experience (of what I will call the technological
order) in museums. My discussion will hedge Dreyfus's bets,
as well, by suggesting that in the contemporary arts we
already have a means of showing ourselves to ourselves with
respect to the technological order, in the form of the video
environment.
3. Video Environments in Museums
When Nam June Paik took a television set in 1958 and
magnetized the top of it and set it in a gallery, an unfamiliar
relation between the television and its viewer arose in stark
contrast to the familiar living room experience. Later in video
history, Mary Lucier took an interest in schematizing the living
room experience itself, setting it in the museum,
defamiliarizing it, and redefining our sense of dwelling in the
spaces we daily inhabit. She was thus among the first to
explore the concept of the video environment as distinct from
the video installation (c.f., respectively, Mary Lucier's Asylum,
A Romance and Chris Marker's Silent Movie.) (Click for
illustrations.)
A video environment such as Asylum is a display in a museum
or gallery that is encompassed by a divide of some kind (so
that it is not subject to juxtaposition with other works). The
parts are related intentionally, either as a whole completed in
the artist's conception, or as a proposed whole to be judged in
the viewer's experience of the work.[9] Quite different from
projecting oneself into the space of a painting, one is invited
bodily into the space of the work.[10] And, through
defamiliarization, one is invited to contemplate, in the
Cartesian sense of the transcendence of the everyday, one's
bodily relation to technology in a space marked out for
temporary habitation.
Thus we find, in a way that Descartes could not have
considered, contemplation without bodily dissociation,
contemplation that is possible only in an immersive state;
immersion, again, not in the sense of drowning out the senses
in pure thought about thought (the theoria Aristotle
distinguished from poiesis and praxis that would later be taken
up by the theologians), nor in the sense of looking at
something through something else, such as a window pane or
a picture frame (the modern mode of thinking on thinking by
framing thought with the conditions of cognition), but rather in
the sense of being inside the chamber of a camera obscura,
experiencing the ontological difference between the image on
the far wall and all else that the chamber contains, including
one's bodily self.
The video environment functions like the camera obscura in
that it defamiliarizes what is familiar (the technological order),
yet unlike it in that it links the body with the other contents of

the room, so that one's thinking is immersed in the conditions
for dwelling made palpable, if not always visible.[11] A
successful video environment is one that makes some aspect
of the technological order, i.e., the way our lives are mediated,
organized, or routed by technology, more transparent to those
who experience the work as it was intended to be
experienced, through immersive contemplation.[12]
In everyday experience, we conduct and experience our lives
in positive ways or in negative ones (as Wilson describes), but
we do not have at our ready disposal a facilitating framework
for contemplating an aspect of experience. Artists devise these
out of ordinary experience in the arduous process of creating
their art, and the museum furnishes the setting for
contemplating their creations.[13]
It is one thing, for example, to live in a "smart house" (to be
immersed or to dwell in it) and another to bracket and
represent an aspect of it. Consider the following hypothetical
case of a "smart house" represented as a video environment:
One enters, unaware that the display's walls are rigged with
equipment that caters to one's every need, and that one's
needs are being continually monitored. Only by playing along
and pretending to dwell in the space does one find the first
clue: lamps that light over one's head as one moves, a
refrigerator that asks whether one really needs to eat at two
o'clock in the afternoon, and if so, whether what one really
needs is a hunk of cheese: "Wouldn't a glass of milk do nicely?
You don't want to lose your girlish figure!"
Suppose you're a man of age thirty-eight. Would the success
of the environment, in your estimation, depend upon the
accuracy of its judgment of your figure, your goals for your
figure, your further discovery of the relation between your
actual particulars and the utterances of the smart appliances?
Would it depend upon your knowledge of how well or wittily
the environment corresponds to smart houses you've visited?
Or would it depend upon the condition of your memory of the
interactive computer you played with at the "Iterations" exhibit
at the International Center of Photography, New York
City?[14] You're stuck. This isn't like Bill Viola's room of
projected angels. (Click for illustration.) This is more like a
smart house! But it's not . . . very smart. You forgot to look at
the title of the display. There it is. It says: "Smart Aleck
House."[15] Well, you think, if this work was intended to scare
me, it's been a success.
In the next section I will delineate the conditions under which
contemplation can become immersive (in the above sense) in
the museum through the in(ter)vention of a certain kind of
artist and the respective video genre, and not through other
genres and mere experiences.
4. Video Environments as Occasions for Immersive
Contemplation
It seems initially plausible to hold that the proprioceptive link
between the body and the objects surrounding it is guided by
the dispersal of light in a room. So I turn to consider whether
immersive contemplation in a video environment requires that
light be present. Take Tony Oursler's System for Dramatic
Feedback (Click for illustration). The gallery is darkened, as in

a movie theater, and one is met at the threshold by a rag doll
with a face animated by video projection. The doll, reminiscent
of television's Mr. Bill, cries out, "No! No!," signaling that
something is going on inside that is dreadful and that one
enters at one's own risk.
Inside, in the immediate foreground, one sees a conical heap
of quilts interspersed with rag dolls similar to the "Mr. Bill"
figure, each with a tiny projected video face. From the ceiling,
a giant projected video hand sweeps down to repeatedly
"spank" a bent-over male figure on top of the pile, who
responds by screaming. Other dolls in the heap have different
actions that they repeat, as in the compulsive loop of a
traumatic childhood memory. Projected on the back wall of the
gallery is an image of a movie theater audience. Its members
chew popcorn and look on passively at an implied screen.
Oursler thus brackets the cinematic mode of regard, and sets
it in comparison to the mode of regard of the gallery visitor.
Further, by darkening the room and illuminating only the rag
doll heap, he establishes a comparison between the traumatic
episodes enacted by the dolls and the implied diegetic events
on the implied movie screen.
Whether the subject of contemplation is the media's creation
of a feedback loop of the spectacle of human suffering or the
passive memory of trauma represented by the looped actions
of the dolls and by the daze the movie spectators are in,
darkening the gallery invites a proprioceptive comparison of
the visitor's body and mode of regard with bodies and modes
of regard represented in the display, thus occasioning an
immersive experience of bodily self-in-relation.
More typically, the dispersal of light throughout a room
occasions immersion by making it more like a prototypical
everyday space in which humans and other animals immerse
themselves, such as a home, as in Lucier's Oblique House,
Valdez and Last Rites, Positano, or a natural habitat, as in
Lucier's Asylum, a Romance and Noah's Raven. (Click for
illustrations.) When an immersive state has been occasioned,
giving rise to contemplation without disrupting the immersion
becomes the artist's subsequent challenge.
Oblique House is an ideal example of how this works. In the
work, the illuminated video environment is actually devised as
a house haunted by ghosts of two different disasters, an
earthquake and an oil spill, a century apart, that struck
Valdez, Alaska. Faces are seen and voices heard on monitors
in the room's four corners, each belonging to a denizen of
Valdez, each describing a personal loss incurred as a result of
disaster. The monitors have sensors that visitors set off as
they pass, and the sensors can be set off simultaneously, in
orchestrated ways, if visitors experiment and contemplate
possible responses to the testimony. As active temporary
inhabitants, visitors can thus symbolically "help" the victims
join together, mourn, and recover. And in this way,
illumination and interactive technology help Oblique House
bring about the immersive contemplation of a place and a
people, and their loss as a result of man-made and natural
disasters.
Employing interactive technology is no more a necessary
condition for a work to succeed in this genre than is

illumination, however. Arguably, Asylum, A Romance,
succeeds without it. Asylum contains one video monitor that
has been hoisted on a forklift in a section of the room
thematized as a junkyard. It displays junkyard images and
emits grating, industrial noises, but is not set up to be
interactive. The success of the environment as a dysfunctional
whole depends upon the visitor's contemplation of aspects of
the environment that can only be noticed through immersion,
specifically by noticing the different kinds of partitions in the
space. These are thematized by different kinds of gates, from
industrial steel to loosely latticed wood plaits, that divide a
cultivated sculpture garden from an antique tool shed and
from the junkyard. Only through immersion can one notice
these things, and thus be positioned to contemplate the
question the exhibit foregrounds: the habitability of a world in
which the different kinds of partitions in question are in place
or absent.
All along I have been assuming that a video environment must
be constructed literally out of technology. Yet surely there are
cases that should be included in this genre where the
constructed environment is about video or an aspect of the
technological order without containing any of what it
represents. In the simplest case, imagine a museum display of
a contemporary living room in which video technology is
nowhere in sight. The display is about video technology if only
because it foils strong expectations that video be present.
Assuming, then, that the living room is clearly contemporary,
and that the work is clearly somehow about some aspect of
video technology that is expected but missing from sight, as
an elliptical sentence can be about the part of it that has been
left out, it seems unproblematic to pronounce this a video
environment.
The crux of pronouncing something like the above a "video
environment" is that aboutness is notoriously difficult to
establish (i.e., the "somehow" might be difficult, though I see
no reason to think it impossible, for an artist to fill in); for it is
highly contingent on established expectations and the
conventions governing them, or so we learned as the history
of abstract art began to develop in the twentieth century. What
is a mere white cube presented by Robert Morris about? We
say that there is no knowing without knowing the history of
minimalism, and so on back to impressionism.
In contemporary art, lines of interpretation are even more
difficult to establish, for there are so many lines crosshatching. For example, the swarms of butterfly cut-outs
presented by Bennie Flores Ansell might be said to be about
an aspect of the technological order, though materially they
are no more than inkjet photographs on transparencies, not
the digital technology itself. A Filipino-American obsessed with
Imelda Marcos and her personal style, Ansell has plied the
digital arts intending to raise eyebrows at Marcos's spending
habits or, rather with her spending habits given her political
position (this is what the artist actually told me after a
presentation of her work). She crafts butterflies from
Photoshopped™ digital snapshots of the stiletto-heeled
Ferragamo shoes that fill Marcos's closet. By covering walls in
museums, galleries, and department stores with swarms of
these creatures, she creates environments that are beautiful

and even faintly menacing.[16] Unquestionably, she creates
immersive environments; it is only a question of what her
works are about, for without the understory about Marcos, one
cannot detect anything especially menacing about her shoeflies. They simply look beautiful, even when bending around
corners and spilling onto the ceiling.
The intended criticism of the effect of Marcos's style on her
constituency is nowhere apparent because cutouts of digital
photographs are removed from what they take critical aim at:
there is nothing especially menacing about shoes, even
stiletto-heeled ones photographed and morphed into
butterflies, and considered apart from their owner's behavior.
A history of conventions linking shoe-flies to a media-induced
culture of envy is simply not firmly in place. Thus, Ansell's
work is not clearly about the technological order, as against
nature or fashion, and it could certainly not be called a video
(or even a digital photography) environment.
Bill Viola's Five Angels for the Millennium (click for illustration)
introduces the inverse possibility: that an apparent video
environment might be about something other than the
technological order. Viola projects on the walls of a gallery five
sequences with angelic figures, surrounding the visitor with
staggered sound and visual effects. In this darkened gallery,
unlike a movie theater, one becomes aware of the 360 degree
moving arc of one's eyes, then head, then body,
contemplating the relation between the projections; and it is
difficult not to be aware of one's body, softly illuminated, in
relation to the life-size angel projections before one. Without
question, one contemplates these figures and the work's
meaning with proprioceptive awareness. Every demarcating
feature of the video environment genre seems present, every
one but the representation of the technological order.
How can one tell what this work is about? First one sees that
Viola's video sequences are representational in that they
contain humanlike figures. The action, however, is nondiegetic: There is no represented world like our own, causally
ordered and inhabited by fully-defined characters. In short,
there is no world order. We might then suppose that, since
they are called "angels," these figures are, in fact, symbols,
but of what? They are rendered nearly tangible, more than
symbolic paintings can make them, anyway, for here they
loom before one, life-sized, moving, and audible. In
representing angels, figures that by convention symbolize
something, namely, a spiritual order, media technology is
made to serve as a medium of an order quite other than
itself.[17]
In some sense, then, it is about the technological order.
However, the otherworldly aspect of it strains the lines I want
to draw between video environments,where one might dwell,
and, say, video visitations. What makes Angels so interesting
is that it sticks a toe over every line I want to draw. Is it a
video environment? If not, it comes close on every vector.
Finally, what kind of environment does a video environment
have to be to occasion immersive contemplation? The
definition in Section 3 bears repeating because it highlights the
bracketing aspect of an environment:

"A video environment is a display in a museum or gallery that
is encompassed by a divide of some kind (so that it is not
subject to juxtaposition with other works), the parts of which
are related intentionally, either as a whole completed in the
artist's conception, or as a proposed whole to be judged in the
viewer's experience of the work."
In paragraph two of Section 3, above, I add that we tend to
find an environment immersive if and only if it is "like a
prototypical everyday space in which humans and other
animals immerse themselves" or dwell. Could an everyday
dwelling space satisfy both conditions, that is, be immersive
and yet bracketed, artfully arranged and presented to viewers
without being presented in a museum? Outside of the
museum, people are seen dwelling in media-saturated
environments constantly: Digital cameras hidden in homes can
be accessed on the Internet by anyone with the requisite
technology who knows the websites to visit. As a result, it
cannot be claimed that the museum alone can bracket
everyday experience or set dwelling in relief from the flow of
experience. For, if an audience as widely drawn as the
museum-going public were directed to one website, this would
seem to be the equivalent of what a museum can achieve.[18]
If my language is tentative, it is because I register a
difference between what can be experienced at a desk in front
of a computer and what can be experienced at a museum.
Only at a museum, or at a desk in front of a computer in a
video environment at a museum, does one become bodily
immersed in the environment one contemplates. By taking in a
scene with one's eyes only, what one gains in enjoyment of
the spectacle one loses in immersive appreciation of it.
Perfectly immersed, the star of the Reality TV show in question
knows what it is like to dwell in that environment, assuming
that the star is aware of the level of media saturation he or
she is faced with, while the voyeur, not immersed, can only
contemplate in the more limited pictorial mode. What it is like
to be the star of a Reality TV show, where one lives every
aspect of one's domestic life in the public eye, I could not
convey here by phenomenological description and, at the risk
of circular argument, must defer to artists who create
immersive video environments for museum display.[19] Thus,
I can only conclude that a video environment must be
displayed in a space to which those who would appreciate it
can have physical access.
But what is so limiting about the pictorial mode, after all; or,
conversely, what is so special about bodily immersion? The
2004 remake of The Stepford Wives depicts smart people
living in smart houses in an affluent Connecticut suburb; Brazil
also, more futuristically, depicts people living in smart
tenements, surrounded by smart appliances. Given that both
movies and video environments have the bracketing necessary
to give rise to contemplation, what differentiates the value of
these films from that of "Smart Aleck House," in Section 3,
above, as criticisms of the smart aleck aspect of the
technological order? The film's degree of remove from
experience that qualifies as "bodily immersive" can count for
or against its valuation. As a complex narrative case against
smart aleck technology based on the story of individuals
represented by actors depicting fictional characters, it is

almost categorically impossible for a film to compare with a
video environment.
On a Platonic view, according to which a representation of
something exists at a compromised level of reality, a video
environment might seem to have more direct personal
relevance to its audience. Though a representation, bracketed
and in that sense like a narrative film, it is less removed than
a film is from what it represents. Accordingly, the closer a
representation is to being actually lived, the more moving it
can be; and the more moving, the more valuable. The
conditions for reception are also a factor; immersion goes
beyond mere bodily presence in the space of the work. In a
video environment, one is free to probe and to discover the
order created by the artist in any order one chooses. One is
confined to something like a diegesis (the narrative world of
the film) only insofar as the technological order represented in
the environment is a representation of the world we recognize
as our own, with the same causal laws and, perhaps, similar
human values. One can experience the environment in a way
that fails to make narrative sense, or argument, or criticism,
of the artist's intentions, but it cannot be said that a video
environment coerces the understanding by adhering to
narrative conventions as mainstream films do.[20] Rather, its
force derives from its nearness to lived experience; for it is, as
a narrative film cannot be, a representation of the
technological order that is, in the above (more active) sense,
immersive.
At the very least, one might argue, in order for the viewer of a
film, or a painting or photograph, to pass from voyeuristic to
immersive mode, provisions for a more immersive reception
than is traditional would have to be made by the curator. It
was asked, when I read an earlier draft of this paper at the
University of Washington, Seattle, whether a painting would
become a different kind of work if a painter were to require
that a magnifying glass be hung next to it in the museum so
as to encourage the spectator to experience the surface and
frame as three-dimensional. Granted, the added spatial
dimension invites the mode of regard belonging to sculpture,
and the moving frame of the magnifying glass brings a
temporal dimension to the experience that is like the mode of
viewing video installations. However, to claim that the
experience of the painting is then fully immersive would seem
to require something more.
In a passionate argument for an "engaged" mode of viewing
paintings and of experiencing both art and everyday life,
Arnold Berleant argues that, indeed, when we look closely and
actively at representational paintings, we can enter their
perceptual space, thus dissolving the boundaries between
subject and object, and engaging with the work.[21] It seems,
however, that to deny the distinction between the space of the
viewer's body and the space represented in the painting would
be to accept that space is not the space of Newtonian science
and, commensurably, linear perspective, and that the
experience of space(s) can be coherently conceptualized in
more than one "natural" or naturalistic way. A
phenomenologist, for example, would make this argument, but
anyone committed to making a physical distinction between
the space of the museum and the space of the painting,

whether merely for convenience or out of some dogmatic
physicalist commitment, would grant that literal "immersion"
within the museum is possible only in the space of the
museum: one can sit on a chair in the museum, but not on the
chair in a painting. So it seems that while there might be
gradations of invited engagement with works, such as
paintings, photographs, and films that jog the memory of
actual dwelling more than others, true immersion begins and
ends in whatever space is occupied by the body, the space
that, because of walls and such, can actually compel and
legislate experience.[22]
5. Conclusion: The Value of the Video Environment as a
Genre
In summary, one can contemplate something immersively only
if one can be immersed in it and, moreover, only if
contemplation is possible in an immersive state. I hope, in this
essay, to have illuminated the conditions under which both of
these conditions can be satisfied.
The value of the video environment, I have further argued, is
that it shows us powerfully and directly our mediated lives and
the possibilities for them in ways that facilitate and require the
proprioceptive immersion in question. By confronting the
represented technological order with the body, and vice-versa,
the work assaults the everyday mode of dwelling that we now
or could in the future take for granted, punctures it with our
presence, and shows us how the body shapes and is shaped
by technology in everyday life. The overarching value of such
a genre, despite its relative expense, is that it allows us to
more fully grasp aspects of the relation between our embodied
needs and technology and to judge the humanity or
inhumanity of the seemingly endless variety of ways in which
our lives are technologically mediated. In order to evaluate a
dwelling condition, one must be in a position to know what it
is like, and this is the primary challenge of the video
environment, whereas traditional art has often served,
conversely, to prove dwelling conditions that may once have
seemed beneath notice to be worthy of recognition (Vermeer's
art is exemplaryof this).
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one art form has
given way to another, painting to photography, photography
to film, and film to video, in the quest for the more perfect,
more fully immersive way of representing reality, physical or
mental, and the way it is constituted, as this essay has
described it.[23] Has this essay been an argument along those
familiar lines, an argument that video is the culmination of the
momentous movement toward one comprehensive medium? I
have argued that video environments make use of conventions
developed in museums for the display of paintings and
sculptures, but for a new purpose that does not supplant the
old ones. I have also shown how video environments compare
with narrative films, and have demonstrated that one cannot
be seen as an improvement over the other in all ways.
Therefore, this should not be mistaken for an argument that
video environments supplant other art forms or genres.
A third challenge inherent in the genre under discussion is that
the artistic status of a video environment, as in the case of any
artwork, depends upon how well the proposed work fits within

a frame of tried and true works that are also, one hopes, witty
and prophetic.[24] Since they occupy physical space and tend
to be made out of technology that represents itself, however,
video environments correspond more to lived experience than
to other artworks in museums, and thus are mainly
comparable with other video artworks. Moreover, as
environments as opposed to installations, they defy
juxtaposition that facilitates interpretations that lead to the
classification of mere things as works of art. Thus, the
question of their status and value as art may seem, at best, an
afterthought.
This does not make video environments something other than
art, but it does put them at the other end of the development
that conceptual art opened up: the obsessive testing of the
boundaries between art and non-art. The genre's function, its
social purpose, has outstripped the need for it to contend for a
place in the art museum, as opposed to any other kind of
public display space, and now it finds itself between one kind
of museum and another. Its permanent home, typically, is on
videotape or in the artist's space, but a video environment at
its best, ultimately, is an immersive, contemplative, and
transformative experience like no other that we take home
with us and keep in memory.
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